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Summary 
We evaluate the demand for long term care (LTC) insurance prospects in a stated 
preference context, by means of the results of a choice experiment carried out on a 
representative sample of the Emilia-Romagna population. Choice modelling techniques 
have not been used yet for studying the demand for LTC services. In this paper these 
methods are first of all used in order to assess the relative importance of the 
characteristics which define some hypothetical insurance programmes and to elicit the 
willingness to pay for some LTC coverage prospects. Moreover, thanks to the 
application of a nested logit specification with ‘partial degeneracy’, we are able to 
model the determinants of the preference for status quo situations where no systematic 
cover for LTC exists. On the basis of this empirical model, we test for the effects of a 
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Abstract
We evaluate the demand for long term care (LTC) insurance prospects in a stated
preference context, by means of the results of a choice experiment carried out on a rep-
resentative sample of the Emilia-Romagna population. Choice modelling techniques
have not been used yet for studying the demand for LTC services. In this paper
these methods are ￿rst of all used in order to assess the relative importance of the
characteristics which de￿ne some hypothetical insurance programmes and to elicit the
willingness to pay for some LTC coverage prospects. Moreover, thanks to the applica-
tion of a nested logit speci￿cation with ￿ partial degeneracy￿ , we are able to model the
determinants of the preference for status quo situations where no systematic cover for
LTC exists. On the basis of this empirical model, we test for the e⁄ects of a series of
socio-demographic variables as well as personal and household health state indicators.
Keywords: Health Insurance, Long Term Care, Choice Experiments, Nested Logit Models
JEL classi￿cation: I11, I18, H40, C25.
1 Introduction
Over the last 15 years, both the social policy debate and the economic literature have paid
growing attention to the problem of ensuring adequate ￿nancing and provision of long term
care (LTC) services (e.g. Eisen and Sloan, 1997). This was re￿ ected in important reforms
of the system of public bene￿ts involving countries such as Germany in 1994, Luxembourg
in 1998 and Japan in 2000. Even in countries that did not experience analogous radical
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1changes, major concerns have been expressed over the increasing trends in LTC expenditures
that challenge the ￿nancial sustainability of the di⁄erent systems and raise delicate equity
issues.
Economic literature on LTC has focused on two main issues. On the one hand, researchers
have tried to provide indications on expected trends of LTC costs in order to advise policy
makers on the amount of resources that are likely to be absorbed by these services. On the
other hand, a great deal of theoretical and empirical work has tried to understand why the
insurance market does not work e⁄ectively in transferring LTC risk. Until now, results of
both strands of literature have been only partially satisfactory.
As for future LTC costs, it is extremely di¢ cult to develop reliable forecasts for them.
Demographic and economic factors interact in a complex way, and their evolution is pre-
dictable only to a limited extent. Even very accurate projections are extremely sensitive to
slight changes in the basic assumptions on the evolution of the main determinants of LTC
expenditures, such as the disability rates per age group, the distribution of demand between
home and residential care, and changes in the unit costs of care (Hancock et al, 2003). At
the same time, it has been shown that this phenomenon is often associated with a reduction
in the di⁄erence between female and male lifespans. As a consequence, the expected raise
in LTC needs may be o⁄set by increased opportunities of mutual support between partners
(Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2002).
In principle, lack of accurate information on the demand side would not raise serious
concerns, if one could simply rely on market mechanisms for ensuring an adequate coverage
against the risk of disability in old age. Yet, since it is common knowledge that private
insurance markets for LTC are usually very small, a series of arguments have been explored
in current literature in order to ￿nd a rational explanation for this phenomenon, which is
present in very di⁄erent countries, irrespective of the way health and social care are organised
(Norton, 2000). Potential explanations have been suggested both for the supply and demand
side. In the ￿rst case, they range from market failures such as adverse selection and ex-
post moral hazard which a⁄ect LTC more manifestly than the health insurance market, to
the existence of aggregate undiversi￿able risk (Cutler, 1993). Lack of demand is, instead,
mainly attributed to the myopic behaviour of young generations, who underestimate the
risk of disability; and to the ￿intra-family￿strategic behaviour of elderly people, who foster
personal care by adult children by not providing for themselves with coverage. (Pauly, 1990;
Zweifel and Str￿we, 1998). Yet, a robust empirical validation for most of these conjectures
remains to be found (e.g., Sloan and Norton, 1997; Sloan, Picone and Hoerger, 1997; Mellor,
2001). Besides, formal LTC services have partial substitutes that may reduce the demand
for coverage. Public assistance may crowd out private demand for care or even induce
individuals to strategically choose sub-optimal levels of coverage because they rely on last
resort public intervention. Finally, individuals may prefer to purchase formal care at the
point of demand rather than acquiring ex-ante coverage.
2It has been recently shown that in the US market, although there is some evidence of
supply side market failures, they do not seem to be primarily responsible for small market
size (Brown and Finkelstein, 2004). The latter result con￿rms the importance of a better
understanding of demand patterns. With this objective in mind, our paper proposes a
complementary approach with respect to those usually adopted in current literature. We
focus on the demand side for LTC coverage in Italy, an institutional context where it would
be impossible to evaluate it from actual expenditure data, given that the market is very
limited. Moreover, the problems previously discussed suggest that an unmet demand for
risk coverage is likely to arise. All this paves the way to adopting a ￿ stated preferences￿
approach instead of the more common ￿ revealed preferences￿studies. For our purpose, the
advantage of studying demand in hypothetical markets is twofold. It gets rid of supply side
imperfections which may hamper voluntary transactions between economic agents, and it also
enables us to explore how preferences vary according to alternative institutional solutions.
Our study uses discrete choice modelling technique, and the purpose is to detect the main
determinants of the demand for LTC coverage, and provide estimates for the willingness to
pay (WTP) for alternative cover programmes. In particular, a choice experiment was carried
out on a sample representative of the population of the Italian region Emilia-Romagna. While
the use of choice modelling, since the seminal works by Propper (1990, 1995), has become
standard practice in health economics, to our knowledge these techniques have never been
used for studying the demand for LTC insurance. The choice modelling approach allows us
to identify the relative importance of the characteristics of an insurance programme.
The answers to the choice experiment have been studied through well established regres-
sion techniques. In particular, theoretical reasons and hypothesis testing has led us to rely on
a ￿ nested logit with partial degeneracy￿speci￿cation. By doing so we have, on the one hand,
endorsed and tried to make more operational the Ryan and Skatun (2004) recommendation
to model the opting out option in stated preference studies. On the other hand, we have
analysed both the relative attractiveness for di⁄erent insurance prospects, and the overall
propensity to insure against LTC-related expenditures, i.e. the choice of whether to prefer
one of the hypothetical policies proposed, or the existing situation. In view of this, we test
for the e⁄ects of a series of socio-demographic variables, family composition, personal and
household health status indicators. We ￿nd a strong signi￿cance for the selected attributes
in determining the WTP, with indications in line with economic theory. Also demographic
and personal status indicators display clear signi￿cance in modelling the opt-out (i.e. choice
of the status quo) stage in the nested logit framework.
The structure of the paper is the following. The next section illustrates the main features
of the survey carried out, while section 3 is devoted to the presentation of the econometric
framework. In section 4 we present the results of our estimates. Finally, section 5 concludes
and discusses the policy implications of WTP estimates.
32 The dataset and the discrete choice experiment
Italy is characterised by the absence of universal programs for covering LTC expenditures. In
order to collect information on the potential interest for implementing new programs aimed
at ￿nancing LTC expenditures, a survey was carried out between October and December
2002 on a regional scale as part of a national interest project on LTC. A questionnaire col-
lecting information on socio-economic status, health conditions and household demographic
composition was submitted by means of 1405 personal interviews to a representative sample
of the population of the Italian region Emilia-Romagna. In this paper we use a subsample
of 1176 observations for which the information about the net family income is available, and
for which a check was run on the internal consistency of the answers.
The interview included a discrete choice experiment designed to elicit the WTP for
LTC coverage. Originally developed in transportation and marketing literature, the choice
experiment technique has increasingly found applications in environmental economics (e.g.,
Hanley, Mourato and Wright, 2001) and, in more recent years, in health economics (e.g.
Propper, 1995; Ryan and Gerard, 2003).1
In the setting-up of a choice modelling analysis, the ￿rst issue to be addressed is the
de￿nition of a hypothetical scenario that serves as a framework for individual choices. The
scenario for this work was constructed following the indications emerged from a panel of
economists and statisticians from the University of Bologna and experts of health and so-
cial services from the Regional Agency of Health Care Services of Emilia Romagna. The
choice of the attributes was based on two main criteria: policy relevance and feasibility
of administration addressed within general personal interviews carried out in respondents￿
homes. In order to reduce task complexity for respondents, no more than four attributes
were considered.
Indeed, the de￿nition of the scenario is typically a very critical operation, and we have
to consider that LTV encompasses a wide range of services and includes levels of disability
that vary considerably. Moreover, because for the same health conditions di⁄erent transfer
schemes can be designed, ranging from in-kind provision of care, to cash payment de￿ned
according to severity or to the expenses actually a⁄orded. The survey tackles this complexity
by anchoring the insurance coverage to a speci￿c health status, described as a condition in
which people need help for several hours per day in their activities of daily living and for
which both home and residential care can be considered appropriate from a clinical point
of view although they are di⁄erent with respect to the monetary cost and the burden of
care-giving left to the family. In order to ensure a homogeneous perception of the health
status described above, the amount of care needed was also quanti￿ed in monetary terms,
by prospecting a monthly cost of 1550 euros (former 3,000,000 ITL) in the case of residential
1While we are not aware of oher choice modelling studies on the demand for LTC insurance, a few analyses
based on contingent valuation methods have recently appeared (Costa-Font and Rovira-Forns, 2004; Brau
et al, 2004))
4care and of 1033 euros (former 2,000,000 ITL) for home-care. It was speci￿ed that these
amounts had to be considered as extra-costs, in addition to the support currently o⁄ered by
the public sector. Moreover, respondents were informed that the service proposed did not
imply the lack of coverage for more (or less) severe conditions.
A second problem is represented by the typical form assumed by existing health insurance
schemes, which usually include clauses for the extension of coverage to family members.
The extension to additional members of the household is straightforward in case of public
coverage, where the service typically covers the entire population. In case of private voluntary
insurance, extensions are usually available in standard contracts. However, had the survey
allowed for that, the individual WTPs recorded would have been referred to inherently
di⁄erent goods since each respondent could have thought of (implicitly) covering a di⁄erent
number of people according to each person￿ s family conditions. So as to circumvent this
problem, respondents were explicitly informed that the insurance plans proposed in the
choice experiment were to be considered as covering only the respondent, notwithstanding
the existence of a wider range of possibilities in the real world.
Starting from this common framework, some hypothetical insurance schemes for LTC
risk were proposed to the respondent. Each alternative varied with respect to the values and
characteristics assumed by four relevant attributes: a) the funding scheme, b) the insurance
premium, c) the degree of coverage (copayment rate), d) the option right for extending
coverage to the additional expenditures determined in the case residential care is chosen.
The following table describes the attributes and related levels which were used in the choice
experiments.
Table 1: The attributes and levels for the LTC policy
Attributes Levels
Financing scheme: Public (general taxation/compulsory participation)
Private (insurance premium/voluntary participation)
Yearly cost of coverage: (in Euros) 103 258 387 516 775
Degree of coverage : Low coverage (70% copayment rate)
Medium coverage (50% copayment rate)
High coverage  (25% copayment rate)
Total coverage (0% copayment rate)
Option for covering additional costs of residential care: Included Not included
For the case of public funding, it was expressly stated during the interview that the
proposed solution consisted of a homogeneous coverage provided to the whole population.
Participation was to be considered compulsory, and the service ￿nanced by means of an
increase in the income tax actually paid by the respondent. Respondents were informed that
5the price indicated as the insurance cost represented their own additional tax. This typically
implies that richer than average respondents would be asked to contribute more, and vice-
versa for the poorer. Conversely, in case of private insurance participation was voluntary,
and the level of coverage could vary according to the subscriber￿ s preferences. Moreover,
each subscriber would pay a premium that depends on the features of the insurance policy
and to some extent on his personal conditions.
The option for covering additional costs consisted of applying the co-payment rate to
the entire amount of expenditures, also in cases where the subscriber opted for residential
LTC provision. When this later option was not included, the policyholder could still opt for
residential care, but had to bear the entire amount of the consequent additional costs. In
particular, he would not receive any reimbursement for the extra expenditure incurred from
choosing nursing home care.
The combination of these attributes and their levels yields a full factorial of 64 possible
alternative insurance packages. We selected half of this factorial using an end-point fractional
design, so as to allow for interactions between the extremes of the attributes (see LouviŁre
et al, 2000). We also introduced a "status quo option", consisting of no additional coverage
relative to the level guaranteed by the public sector at the time of the interview. As is well
known, in some cases the "no choice" alternative has no explicit economic meaning. In this
case though, the choice of the status quo implies that respondents prefer the current level
of support and are not willing to extend coverage. Figure 1 below presents an example of
one of the show-cards employed to submit various choice sets during the interviews. Each
respondent was asked to select his preferred alternative for 11 di⁄erent choice sets.
Figure 1: An example of the show-cards used in the survey.
Let us  assume  that only the three solutions  below are  made available.  Which
one  would  you choose?
Lire  1.500.000
(€  775) per year
Lire  500.000
(€  258) per year
Cost  of  t he
co verag e
Wi th the option
to cover
residenti al  costs
Wi thout  the
option to cov er
residenti al  costs






(25% left to  the
patient)
Total  cover age





Public cov erage W ay o f p aym en t
Solut ion B Solution A Characteri stics
of the service
Preference r r r
(thick  only  on e)
In order to control for the respondent￿ s actual understanding of the exercise, one of
the choice sets contained a (strictly) dominant alternative, i.e. a pro￿le which has the
same qualitative attributes (public or private ￿nancing and the possibility or not to extend
6coverage to the additional costs of residential care) and does better for at least one of the
quantitative attributes (cost and copayment rate) and does not do worse for the others. The
(very few) respondents who chose the dominated solution were excluded from the sample.
For the respondents who made the ￿correct￿choice, the dominant card was excluded from
the estimation, since the decision on that choice set could not be considered informative with
regard to the trade-o⁄ between attributes.
In experiments with several choices, it is unlikely that replications from the same indi-
vidual will be truly independent, and order bias may arise. To limit this possibility, the
show-cards with the experimental choice sets were rotated sequentially. In general, the only
e⁄ects with repeated choices are on statistical e¢ ciency, but not on unbiasedness (LouviŁre
et al (2000, ch. 9). Train (2003, p. 46, 55) observes that logit probability estimations can
handle the dynamics of repeated choice, including state-dependence, inasmuch as unobserved
factors that a⁄ect decision are independent over time in the repeated choice.
The sample used for the estimation also includes individuals (23% of the sample) who have
always chosen the status quo. We checked whether this could signi￿cantly a⁄ect the quality
of the results. More precisely, with an ad hoc question, we identi￿ed those respondents who
actually did not consider at all the possibility to choose one of the insurance alternatives
proposed since they were not interested in any LTC cover scheme at all. We found that
these answers were quite uniformly distributed throughout the sample, without signi￿cantly
changing the distribution of the design and other relevant characteristics, such as family
income, respondent￿ s age and education level.
Starting from respondents￿stated choices, the choice modelling approach enables us to
evaluate the service on a monetary metric basis, under the assumption that the overall
utility equals the sum of the utilities obtained from each attribute. We conjecture that
utility decreases with cost and copayment rate, whereas it increases with coverage extension.
Conversely, there are no prior expectations on the e⁄ect of moving from a public to a private
￿nancing scheme.
3 The econometric approach
In most economic applications, data obtained from choice experiments have been studied by
means of a model labelled multinomial logit (henceforth, MNL) by some authors (e.g. Mc
Fadden, 1984), and conditional logit by others (e.g. Greene, 2003). Despite its wiespread
use, the probabilistic structure of the MNL model has some implications which may prove
problematic in our case; more complex approaches may be more appropriate.
In the MNL model, data arising from the k = 1;2; :::K mutually exclusive observed
choices, and taken from a sample of h = 1;2; :::; H respondents, can be described
according to a random utility speci￿cation such as the following:










7where the elements of the vector xk may either refer to the characteristics of the choice
alternatives, or be individual-speci￿c. Individual utility is given by the sum between an
observable component V h
k and a stochastic unobservable component ￿h
k: Depending on the
assumptions made on the distribution of ￿h
k; di⁄erent discrete choice models are obtained.
The MNL assumes that the individual random components ￿h
k are independently and iden-
tically distributed (IID), with an extreme value type 1 (Gumbel) distribution with mean






= 0, so that the
variance ￿ covariance matrix of the MNL simply reduces to ￿ = ￿2I.
The IID assumption leads to the so-called independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)
property, which states that the odds of an alternative k being chosen over alternative l is
independent of the availability of attributes or alternatives other than k and l (McFadden,
1984). However, when there are subsets of similar alternatives, the independence condition
may prove very strong because, within these subsets, some common unobserved factors are
likely to a⁄ect the error standard deviation in a common way that is di⁄erent from the
e⁄ect on less similar alternatives (in practice, originating di⁄erent scale parameters ￿k).
These considerations suggest that the MNL can be not appropriated to our case, where
two alternatives implying di⁄erent forms of coverage extension are compared with a third
solution characterised by no additional cover.
Specifying the nature of the decision process implied by our choice experiment helps
understanding the problem. For any respondent, each repetition of the choice experiment
can be interpreted as the outcome of two (simultaneous) decisions:
￿ whether or not to extend coverage against the risk of LTC expenses or to opt for the
present level of coverage;
￿ choice of the preferred insurance scheme between two alternatives that di⁄er in the
levels of four relevant attributes.
To be consistent with this framework, let us model the unobservables in (1) according to
the following additive error structure:
￿





where the index j relates to the existing ￿ elementary￿alternatives (insurance A, insurance
B, status quo) and i relates to the choice of whether or not to extend coverage against LTC
risk. In other words, the random term a⁄ecting ￿nal choices is the sum of two independent
components: a speci￿c one (conditional on the two decisions) and a common one.
The previous additive speci￿cation is the basis for the nested logit (NL) model, where the
variance (more precisely the scale parameter ￿i) is allowed to di⁄er across ￿nests of choices￿ .
The unobservable terms related to ￿nal choices have a Gumbel distribution with variance
2The symbol ￿ indicates the mode of the distribution, ￿ is a positive scale parameter and ￿ is Euler￿ s












whilst the property of an equal variance is kept within each nest (in our case determined by











The NL model represents the most usual technique used when standard testing proce-
dures reject the IIA assumption. By partitioning the overall decision process according to the
two (or more) choices, NL keeps the IID condition of the error terms within each partition,
whereas the ￿h (i;j) are correlated within nests. As outlined for example by Hunt (2000),
organising alternatives in clusters re￿ ects a supposed similarity between "grouped alterna-
tives". Individuals are hypothesised to consider these as more similar than the alternatives
placed from di⁄erent clusters. It is because of this structure that the use of NL models has
been advocated for the analysis of those choice decision cases where the possibility of ￿non
participation￿exists (e.g. Morey, 1999). In health economics literature, a similar approach
has been proposed by Ryan and Skatun (2004), for analysing the ￿ opting out alternatives￿in
discrete choice experiments. Similarly, in our study the status quo alternative is actually a
non participation alternative, which is intuitively di⁄erent from making a choice among the
insurance alternatives.
By framing the abovementioned two choices as the two nests of a two-level NL model, we
end-up in a ￿ NL with partial degeneracy￿ , given that there is only one single ￿ no insurance￿
option. In the case of our choice experiments, in the ￿rst nest the respondent chooses whether
or not to extend currrent LTC coverage; in the second one he selects his preferred alternative
conditional on having chosen to insure or not.
3.1 A nested logit model with partial degeneracy
It is well known that socio-economic variables need to be considered as alternative speci￿c,
unless the usual linear-in-utility structure is abandoned (e.g. Cherchi and Ortœzar, 2003).
Deciding to include individual speci￿c variabless only in one alternative often is somewhat
arbitrary. This is not the case, however, when, within a NL speci￿cation with a degener-
ate branch, the latter represents a ￿ non participation￿alternative which reposes on a likely
distinct economic rationale. In this case, a NL with partial degeneracy provides a natural
framework for analysing the impact of some important individual-speci￿c e⁄ects (such as
demographic, health and economic status variables) in the utility expression for the top level
(e.g. Greene, 2003; LouviŁre et al, 2000).3
Figure 2 represents our hypothesised decision tree. In the ￿rst stage of the decision
3For a rigourous analysis of nested logit models with partial degeneracy see Hunt (2000), Hensher and
Greene (2002)
9process the respondent chooses whether or not to buy an LTC insurance. In the second
stage he makes his choice among the elemental alternatives of the choice set.
Figure 2: The decision tree for the LTC cover choice experiment
LTC coverage decision
No insurance Insurance
Status quo Alternative A Alternative B
Here we better de￿ne the random utility structure.4 For a generic elemental choice j,
belonging to upper level i, a respondent￿ s utility takes the form:
U (i;j) = Ui + Ujji, (5)
which can also be written as follows:
U (i;j) = V (i;j) + ￿(i;j), (6)
where the V (i;j) indicate the non stochastic utility components and ￿(i;j) = ui+ujji is the
stochastic utility component.
In order to formally de￿ne our case, we distinguish between variables which in￿ uence the
choice at the j level (x), and variables which a⁄ect the choice to insure or not to insure (z).
Given the hypothesis that the deterministic part of the indirect utility function is additively
separable we can write
V (i;j)= Vi + Vjji
= ￿0zk + ￿
0xl
: (7)
By using (2), this leads to:
U (i;j) = ￿
0zi + ￿
0xj + ui + ujji. (8)
At the upper stage (insurance decision), we de￿ne the non stochastic utility component
as:
4Henceforth, we omit the individual index h.
10Ui = ￿
0zi + ui. (9)
The joint probability that household h chooses alternative j is given by the product
between a marginal and a conditional probability:
Pr[yh = i;j] = Pr[wh = i] ￿ Pr[sh = jji]. (10)
A useful way to make the previous expression for NL models explicit is to de￿ne the
probability choice system (PCS), which includes the marginal choice probabilities associated
with the choice at the upper level, the conditional probabilities associated with the choices at
the lower level, and the so called inclusive value (or expected maximum utility).5 As we have
seen with (3) and (4), in a two-level NL model, these variances are related to scale parameters
￿i associated to the upper level, and to ￿i parameters for the elemental alternatives level.
At the ￿lower￿level, the conditional choice probability for the elemental alternatives can be
written in the following way:


















, for all i (11)
where Ji is the number of possible elemental choices in branch i (1 if i=not insure, 2 if i
= insure)
The marginal probability at the ￿upper￿level is:























Hence the joint probability (10) takes the form:
























Two considerations are usually reported in the literature about the role of the scale
parameters and the ratio ￿i=￿i, known as the ￿inclusive value coe¢ cients￿(or parameters).
5The formal expressions for the PCS of the NL proposed by a recent stream of literature (Hensher and
Greene, 2002; Hunt, 2000) pays special attention to the peculiarities of NL with degenerate branches and
the role of normalisation of the scale parameters which are associated with the variances in the nests of the
model.
11The ￿rst relates to the value which the IV coe¢ cient should assume. Given: (i) that in
the NL speci￿cation the variance at the lower level must be the largest since it shares
(by having stochastic component ui + ujji) part of its unobservables with the higher level
(which has stochastic component ui); (ii) the proportionality between the scale parameters
of the Gumbel distribution and the standard deviation of unobservable terms, then if the NL
speci￿cation is correct, the estimated IV coe¢ cient ￿i=￿i must lie in the interval [0;1]. This
result is related to the higher degree of similarity between alternatives which share the same
upper level. In fact, it can be shown that the correlation of the indirect utilities of any pair
of elemental alternatives within the same nest is ￿i = 1 ￿ (￿i=￿i)2, which is clearly zero for
￿i/￿i = 1 (e.g. Ben Akiva and Lerman, 1985; Hunt, 2000). Hence, the closer the coe¢ cient
is to one (zero), the less (more) the degree of perceived similarity between the alternatives.
The second consideration refers to the identi￿cation problems entailed by the scale pa-
rameters. As we can see from equation (12), the IV parameter is identi￿ed (an estimate of
the ratio can be obtained). However, this is not the case for the utility index ￿0zi, since its
value is multiplied by the (unidenti￿ed) scale parameter ￿i. A similar consideration applies
for the lower level utility index ￿
0xjji, given the presence of ￿i.
A normalisation of the general representation of the PCS given by equations (11-13)
is therefore needed, by setting one scale parameter equal to 1 (and common to all nests).
As outlined by LouviŁre et al., there are no clear indications of the particular implications
of normalizing with respect to the branch level scale parameter (￿ = 1) rather than to
the lower level scale parameter (￿ = 1). The same authors report that most empirical
studies normalise the branch level utility index by setting ￿ = 1. From a practical point of
view, this kind of normalisation has the advantage of enabling the researcher to carry out a
direct confrontation of NL estimates with the parameters obtained using a MNL model; it
relates normalisation to total variance of the error distribution; and leads to a simpler PCS.
(Carrasco and Ortøzar, 2002). In the next section, we follow this convention, also in the
light of some invariance results for the case of degenerate branches (see Hunt, 2000). The
expressions of the PCS for the case ￿ = 1 are:
a) conditional choice probability for the elemental alternatives:


















; for all i
b) marginal probability at the ￿branch￿level:
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; for all i. (16)
As can be seen, the change is in the marginal probability at the branch, where the utility
index is directly computable, and the IV parameters reduce to 1
￿i.6 By using the estimate
of the latter, it follows that the lower level utility index can be also identi￿ed. Notice that,
given the theoretical condition ￿=￿i<1, in this case the estimated lower scale parameter ￿i
is expected to be larger than one.
4 Main empirical results
In this section we present the results of our estimates. We start with the outcome of a MNL
estimation carried out with only the attributes as regressors. The results are reported on
the left-hand-side of Table 2.
The coe¢ cients for all attributes are highly statistically signi￿cant. From a policy per-
spective, the most interesting result is that public coverage emerges as the preferred insti-
tutional solution. As expected, both a decrease in the copayment rate and the option for
covering the extra costs for residential care are positively evaluated. It is worth noting the
relatively high value attached to the extension of the coverage to residential care expendi-
tures, which is perceived as a serious risk. By computing the ratios between the estimated
coe¢ cients we can get an indication of the relative importance of the various attributes.
The option for residential care is evaluated as much as 31.3 percent point of coverage, and
obtaining public coverage instead of a private one is valued 16.6 percent coverage points.
However, the McFadden-Hausmann test indicates (chi-sq. = 650) a strong violation of the
IIA hypothesis. Although based on a regression with the design attributes only, this test
is fully reliable, given that the variation of individual-speci￿c attributes, which do not vary
among the choices, does not a⁄ect the stated choices.
A way of overcoming the restrictions imposed by the IIA hypothesis is by means of a sim-
ple "random e⁄ects" multinomial probit estimation (though more structured autoregressive
speci￿cations could also be considered), which results are reported on the right-hand-side of
Table 2. Once accounting for the implicit di⁄erent scale parameter, the explanatory power of
the attributes is con￿rmed and no large variations emerge for the relative size of the parame-
ters (for instance the option for residential care and the di⁄erential e⁄ect of public coverage
are now evaluated as much as 28.5 and 16.3 percentage coverage points, respectively). A
likelihood-ratio test carried out according to suggestions made by Greene (2002) strongly
con￿rms the violation of the IIA hypothesis.
Table 2: Multinomial logit and multinomial probit estimates
6This is true for the non degenerate partition, whereas for the degenerate branch it is not identi￿ed: see
Hunt, 2000.
13Variable “Main effects” MNL model “Main effects” MNP model
Coefficient t-stat. Prob Coefficient t-stat. Prob
Financing scheme  (0 private, 1 public) 0.2960 11.26 0.000 0.1578 9.70 0.000
Extension to residential care expenses 0.5564 21.31 0.000 0.2766 12.85 0.000
Degree of percentage coverage 0.0178 31.20 0.000 0.0097 15.24 0.000
Yearly cost of coverage -0.0016 -25.91 0.000 -0.0008 -14.05 0.000
Alternative specific constant (0=status quo) -1.3933 -25.81 0.000 -0.5683 -8.09 0.000
Diagnostic statistics and tests
Log likelihood function -11625.3 -11585.7
Pseudo R-squared 0.100 0.103
IIA Tests Mc Fadden/ Hausman test
(Excluded choice “status quo”).
Chi-Squared 650.2
Likelihood ratio test for IIA







We move consequently to the estimates of the NL speci￿cation described in the previous
section. With a partially degenerated NL, all attributes of the degenerate alternative as well
as all the observation-speci￿c e⁄ects in a utility expression for the top level of the decision
tree. In our case, there are no speci￿c attributes related to the status quo alternative, so
that we simply relate the whole vector zl of individual characteristics to the choice between
extending coverage or maintaining unchanged the level of protection ensured by current
public support for disabled elderly people.
NL estimations reported in Table 3 have been carried out by normalising on ￿i = 1,
for all i, and this permits a direct comparison with the results of the MNL speci￿cation.
The right-hand-side of the table reports results by a model where the endpoint design of
the experiment has been exploited. Namely, to the regressors of the main e⁄ects design we
added the interactions between public coverage and cover extension for the extreme cases
of a 0 % and 70 % copayment rate. Only the statistically signi￿cant interaction terms are
considered.
A wide range of socio-demographic indicators have been successfully used to de￿ne the in-
dex ￿0z. Following most examples in the literature, they have been included as determinants
of the ￿ no insurance￿choice, so that the associated coe¢ cient represents the (negative of the)
di⁄erential e⁄ect of the socio-demographic variables on the utility of extending coverage as
compared to maintaining the status quo.A ￿rst important remark is that the value of the
IV parameter (0.549 and 0.566) and its signi￿cance indicate the statistical appropriateness
of adopting the two level NL speci￿cation, since the IV coe¢ cient should lie between 0 and
1, where the latter value indicates that a MNL speci￿cation should be preferred. Overall,
it can be seen that a large share of the regressors display signi￿cant e⁄ects and the sign of
the coe¢ cients meets prior expectations in most cases. At the top of the table, the four
attributes included in the insurance package are all highly statistically signi￿cant, although
lower t-statistics indicate higher standard errors than in the MNL model. Note also that the
14coe¢ cients have smaller size in absolute value because of the higher common scale parameter
implied by the NL. The coe¢ cients of the continuous variables (cost and copayment rate)
both have the expected sign. The same holds for the option to extend cover to additional
residential care expenses (dummy equals 1 when the option is included). We leave a more
detailed analysis of the relative importance of various attributes to the next subsection,
where monetary equivalents of the estimates are presented.
In reviewing the results related to the decision of whether or not to insure, recall that a
positive coe¢ cient in our model indicates that there is a higher probability that the status
quo will be opted for. Our speci￿cation ￿rst includes a group of socio-demographic variables
such as household income (de￿ned as net monthly household income), respondent￿ s age,
household size, presence of adult and young children in the household.
Income positively in￿ uences the probability of extending coverage (i.e. negatively af-
fects the choice of the status quo). This result is to some extent in contrast with previous
evidence obtained from revealed preferences studies on the US private LTC market (Sloan
and Norton, 1997) and suggests that at low income levels individuals may have priorities
other than LTC coverage. Given the peculiar nature of LTC, policymakers may negatively
evaluate the possibility that citizens would acquire substantially di⁄erent degrees of cover
due to di⁄erences in income, even if this outcome re￿ ect household preferences. If the policy-
maker￿ s objective function incorporates some speci￿c egalitarian argument for elderly care,
the result for the income coe¢ cient indicates that contributions to public programs should
be designed in a rather progressive manner, possibly including exemptions for low income
groups. This would be the only way to provide coverage to low income groups without im-
posing a constraint that would divert part of their budget towards a service which they not
consider a priority. Contrariwise, tax allowances on private policies, which are e⁄ective in
meeting individual preferences, are likely to widen the di⁄erence in the level of protection
among di⁄erent income groups.
The inclusion in the regression of a dummy variable for the presence of adult children
living at home allows for an assessment of the ￿intra-family moral hazard hypothesis" (IMH).
It has been argued that since elderly people prefer to be assisted by their family members,
they may strategically choose not to insure (e.g. Pauly, 1990; Zweifel and Struwe 1998).
Consequently, adult children have an incentive to provide informal care for their parents,
given that the entire amount of money spent in formal care would reduce future bequests.
In our model, the presence of adult children decreases the likelihood of choosing a larger
coverage, but the e⁄ect is not signi￿cant. In analogy with empirical works for the US
market (Mellor, 2001; Sloan and Norton, 1997), our estimates do not con￿rm the conjecture.
The IMH hypothesis does not seem to have a relevant in￿ uence on household decisions over
the demand for LTC coverage even when only demand side e⁄ects are considered.
The result relating to the age variable suggests that younger generations are more
favourably oriented towards an extension of cover. The myopic attitude of young people
15- who would not demand cover due to a severe underestimation of their future risk of disabil-
ity - has often been suggested as an explanation for the lack of demand of LTC insurance.
Table 3: Estimates results with the nested logit speci￿cation
Explanatory variables Nested Logit with main effects Nested Logit with design
interactions
Coefficient t-stat. Prob Coefficient t-stat. Prob
“Choice of alternatives” process
Financing scheme
(0 private, 1 public) 0.1930 9.80 0.000 0.2443 9.49 0.000
Extension to residential care 0.3413 12.88 0.000 0.3900 12.50 0.000
Degree of % coverage 0.0120 14.78 0.000 0.0116 12.77 0.000
Yearly cost of coverage -0.0011 -14.50 0.000 -0.0011 -14.48 0.000
Interaction between “extension” and
“low coverage” -0.2176 -4.23 0.000
Interaction between financing scheme
and “total coverage” -0.1083 -2.59 0.010
ASC (0 for status quo) -1.1563 -4.81 0.000 -1.1388 -4.71 0.000
“Insurance decision” process
Age 0.0195 7.93 0.000 0.0195 7.93 0.000
Family Income in € -0.0002 -6.43 0.000 -0.0002 -6.41 0.000
Sex (1 if male) -0.1597 -3.63 0.000 -0.1601 -3.64 0.000
Household size 0.1903 7.86 0.000 0.1903 7.85 0.000
Spouse -0.0050 -0.09 0.930 -0.0041 -0.07 0.943
Young children -0.2302 -4.06 0.000 -0.2308 -4.07 0.000
Adult children 0.1119 1.33 0.185 0.1112 1.32 0.188
University degree education -1.1502 -6.39 0.000 -1.1457 -6.36 0.000
Secondary school education -0.6777 -4.00 0.000 -0.6742 -3.98 0.000
Compulsory education -0.5778 -3.48 0.001 -0.5749 -3.46 0.001
Blue collar occupation 0.1049 1.42 0.154 0.1070 1.45 0.146
White collar occupation -0.0270 -0.42 0.673 -0.0264 -0.41 0.680
Retired -0.1988 -2.76 0.006 -0.1978 -2.74 0.006
Not working 0.0272 0.35 0.725 0.0290 0.38 0.707
Other employment status 0.4555 3.12 0.002 0.4578 3.13 0.002
Chronic disease -0.0491 -0.90 0.368 -0.0502 -0.92 0.358
Self assessed health status (0 for
good, 1 for bad) 0.3342 6.28 0.000 0.3351 6.29 0.000
Subscriber of a private health
insurance -0.4719 -8.11 0.000 -0.4714 -8.10 0.000
In hospital in the last year 0.0629 0.94 0.345 0.0631 0.95 0.344
Smoker 0.0782 1.66 0.097 0.0790 1.68 0.094
Preference for “cash” LTC coverage -0.0203 -0.49 0.624 -0.0215 -0.52 0.602
Existence of a person with LTC disability in
the family -0.2535 -5.17 0.000 -0.2531 -5.16 0.000
Health in the first 3 priorities for new
public expenditures -0.3229 -6.25 0.000 -0.3224 -6.24 0.000
Negative opinion of the quality of NHS
care services -0.1724 -3.48 0.001 -0.1734 -3.50 0.001
Negative opinion of existing LTC
services -0.0710 -1.52 0.128 -0.0718 -1.54 0.124
State should pay basic LTC services to all -0.4730 -9.20 0.000 -0.4745 -9.23 0.000
State should pay basic LTC services only to
the poor -0.1563 -2.84 0.005 -0.1569 -2.85 0.004
IV parameters
No insurance unidentified unidentified
Insurance 0.5487 14.545 0.000 0.566 14.535 0.000
Diagnostic statistics and tests Value Value
Log likelihood function -11117.7 -11102.1






Di⁄erent theoretical arguments can be used to explain the relation between demand for a
more ample coverage and age. The most intuitive one is that elderly people are more willing
to contribute to the programme since they are more likely to be in need of LTC in the
16near future. Similarly to what happens with traditional health care insurance, a larger asset
variance in expected expenditures for care should produce this e⁄ect. Our results contend the
empirical relevance of this e⁄ect, however, in line with Becker and Zweifel (2004) who study
hypothetical demand for health insurance in Switzerland in a stated preferences framework.
This result can be rationalised within the framework of theoretical analyses, such as Meier￿ s
(1999), who have stressed the importance of uncertainty in modifying incentives to demand
LTC coverage with age. In particular, greater uncertainty over the probability of becoming
disabled should favour early purchase of LTC insurance, whereas uncertainty over future
costs of disability favour late purchase of insurance. Our results suggest that the ￿rst issue
seems to be more relevant. This is consistent with the structure of the experiment, where
costs of disability were explicitly reported, and with the nature of LTC expenditure, which
is much more standardized than general health expenditure.
An additional possible explanation is that younger people also fear that current welfare
programs might no longer be ￿nancially sustainable once they reach dependency age. Ageing
of the population and increasing restraints on the public budget may limit the provision of
an adequate level of coverage for future generations, who therefore are more interested in
extending current programs. Clearly, what emerges from our results is that the lack of
coverage in real markets cannot simply be attributed to the myopic attitudes of young
generations.
Individuals with poor self rated health state are more likely to opt for the status quo.
A variety of explanations may be viable. In particular, people who su⁄er of a generic bad
health state could presume to qualify for free social care already under current legislation.
Interestingly, however, whilst generic bad health conditions do not increase demand for
coverage, chronic conditions and hospitalisation in the year prior to the survey both have
a positive in￿ uence on the probability of opting for more extensive coverage. People who
have experienced chronic illnesses are probably more aware of the high (monetary and non-
monetary) burden that individuals are currently obliged to assume. They probably already
receive some kind of help (either informal or publicly provided) or they perceive the risk of
needing assistance in the near future as particularly high and in both cases the bene￿ts from
greater coverage are highly evaluated.
Another group of variables included in the regression refers to respondent￿ s educational
and employment status. For education, the reference category represents non educated
respondents, and all the coe¢ cients are statistically signi￿cant with absolute value increasing
with the level of education. This positive correlation between education and propensity to
cover is probably due to a higher awareness of the di¢ culties to face the actual burden
(and the expected increase) of the costs related to informal and formal care. The result is
consistent with empirical evidence provided by the revealed preferences literature that studies
the demand for both LTC (Mellor, 2001) and supplementary medical insurance (Besley, Hall
and Preston, 1999) where most educated households are more likely to purchase coverage.
17On the contrary, individuals￿work status plays a minor role in the decision process.
White and blue collar workers do not reveal any signi￿cant di⁄erence with respect to the
self employed, assumed as base case. Such a result is not totally surprising if one considers
that the argument of greater opportunity costs of illness for self employed individuals is
weakened for the kind of coverage we are considering here since, di⁄erently from standard
health insurance policies, LTC coverage acquires increasing importance with ageing, and
many individuals will experience disabilities after retiring. Still, the coe¢ cients for the
retired and non-occupied condition (though referring to a limited number of respondents)
are signi￿cant, with the former being more likely to choose the status quo.
We have also studied the e⁄ects of a few "opinion variables". A negative opinion on
the quality of care currently provided by the National Health Service favours an extension
of coverage. Individuals do not seem to respond to unsatisfactory quality of public health
care by relying on out-of-pocket expenditures, but to look for additional ￿nancial support
for ancillary programs such as the one proposed here concerning LTC. Our estimated model
also contains an indicator of respondent￿ s opinion on existing LTC services, which does not
show any signi￿cant role.
Finally, being a subscriber to a private health insurance policy has a positive impact on
the likelihood of being willing to contribute to LTC coverage. The result is consistent with
our expectations. On the one hand, policy holders are expected to be more risk averse, and
to perceive the insurance mechanism as an e⁄ective tool for facing health related risks. On
the other hand, familiarity with insurance products reduces perceived transaction costs with
regard to making use of a (new) policy.
4.1 Evaluation of attributes and welfare analysis:
Drawing on the results discussed above, we have estimated the marginal price or WTP
where coverage against LTC risk is itroduced. The issue of deriving welfare measures from
discrete choice experiments has been recently and widely debated in the health economics
literature (Lancsar and Savage, 2004; Ryan, 2004; Santos Silva, 2004). Following Ryan￿ s
(2004) classi￿cation, the subject of interest here is the estimation of welfare e⁄ects related
to a ￿state-of-the-world-model￿ , i.e. a situation where the kind of good or service will be
obtained by an individual is known with certainty (see also LouviŁre et al., 2000, p. 337).
In this case, the welfare measure, namely the compensating variation, for a change in the












where the subscripts (0, 1) de￿ne indirect utility functions before and after the policy change,
and ￿p is an approximation of the inverse of marginal utility of income, which is recovered
from the estimated coe¢ cient of the variable expressed in monetary terms. If only one
18attribute is changing, then we obtain an ￿ implicit price￿ , or marginal WTP. This expression
also represents an appropriate measure for those cases where a quality variation applies to
all the alternatives of the choice set (Haab and McConnell, 2002).
As long as WTP is determined as a di⁄erence between utility functions, it follows that
in our model only the attributes determine the welfare measure, and that the utility index
at the status quo can be set to zero.
Implicit prices for each attribute are reported in the upper part of Table 4, and are
derived from the parameter estimates reported in Table 2 and 3 by dividing the estimated
coe¢ cients of the non monetary attributes by the negative of the cost coe¢ cient. Con￿dence
intervals (at 95%) have been computed with the Krinsky-Robb procedure in order to assess
the robustness of the results.
Table 4: Implicit prices of the attributes and mean WTP for hypothetical schemes
In the "main e⁄ects" MNL and NL models, the estimated marginal WTP amounts to
11.0 Euros per 1% increase in coverage (i.e. reduction of the copayment rate). The WTP
from the NL model is only slightly a⁄ected by the inclusion of the two signi￿cant interaction
terms. The MNP speci￿cation yields the highest value (12.1 Euros).
A remarkable result is the high value attached to the extension of coverage to residential
care expenditures (315 and 352 euros in the two NL speci￿cations; 345 euros in the two
19multinomial models), which testi￿es a strong concern for the risk of being forced to leave
one￿ s own domicile. Finally, the di⁄erential utility for the public solution, amounts to 178
Euros of additional WTP with the NL base model. For this attribute, the di⁄erence between
main e⁄ects and end point design estimates is quite relevant. Public coverage becomes less
important (123 euros) when all LTC expenditures are insured.
We have used equation (17) to get an estimate of the overall mean WTP. Mean WTP has
to be estimated taking into account the negative value of the alternative speci￿c constant
in order to capture the utility loss that would occur in cases where there is compulsory
introduction of the programmes for those respondents who would opt for the ￿ status quo￿ .
The results in the bottom part of Table 4 refer to a few hypothetical schemes and show
that the di⁄erence between the multinomial and the NL estimates is quite large. This is
mainly due to the di⁄erent ASC value, since with the NL model we have considered a series
of individual speci￿c regressors which partly explain the variance of the ￿status quo￿choice.
Di⁄erences in ASC estimates are also responsible for the much larger con￿dence intervals for
the mean WTP estimates in the NL speci￿cation, due to the lower signi￿cance level.
WTP estimates can serve for exploring not only the possibilities of expanding private
markets for LTC insurance but also the political sustainability of implementing new public
programs, and represent a useful benchmark for assessing the potential support of such policy
innovations. Since our analysis is mainly focused on demand, a precise estimate of the actual
costs of providing additional LTC coverage for public and private insurers is beyond the scope
of the paper. However, some indications that broadly re￿ ect the supply side conditions in
the Italian context can be collected, either from existing studies or from a direct inspection
of the (narrow) existing private markets, and can be compared to mean WTPs obtained
from our experiment, in order to make some conjectures on the extent to which supply can
match demand for coverage.
Existing supply-side studies in Italy are micro-simulation exercises carried out on a re-
gional basis mainly to provide policymakers with some broad indications on the approximate
tax price for expanding public guarantees in the LTC area, but which usually do not aim
to develop accurate forecasts for future ￿nancial needs.They consequently su⁄er from some
ambiguities in the exact nature of the claims citizen will be entitled to, and on the kind of
services involved. More in general, the coverage scenarios considered are not fully compa-
rable with those we proposed. Ahead of these limitations, Lemmi and Sciclone (2003) have
estimated an average tax price increase of 392 Euros per household for implementing a com-
prehensive coverage program for LTC in Tuscany (a region which has many similarities with
Emilia Romagna in terms of socio-demographic characteristics and quality and organisation
of welfare services). The authors hypothesise two alternative ￿nancing schemes both based
on personal income taxation. One with a uniform increase of 2.4% in the tax rate, and a
more progressive one where the tax rate increases from 2.2% up to 3.3%. A similar policy
change is explored by Coda Moscarola (2003) for a di⁄erent Italian region, Piedmont. She
20obtains that if all citizens above 24 years of age were asked to contribute, the personal ￿scal
contribution would range from 383 to 340 Euros according to whether services are more
oriented towards residential or home care.
As for the information that can be recovered from private markets, one can infer an
estimate of costs of coverage by referring to the present prices of the LTC policies. Such
products have been introduced in Italy only recently, and the number of policies sold is still
very limited. Prices are usually set after collecting personal information on the potential
subscriber through a questionnaire but, at least for some insurance companies, it is possible
to gather information on their current average prices, conditional on observable individual
characteristics such as age, gender and (sometimes) province of residence. Again, any com-
parison between such prices and our estimates must be taken very cautiously. First, the
bene￿ts policies will a⁄ord vary according to severity, whereas we were forced to limit our
scenario to a single health status for minimising cognitive di¢ culties of the respondents.
Moreover, real LTC policies may contain additional clauses not considered in our simpli￿ed
hypothetical package. Finally, the way bene￿ts are provided may di⁄er substantially between
policies (e.g., some companies concentrate relatively more on home care support, whilst oth-
ers are more oriented to cover residential care needs; some may provide only cash bene￿ts,
while others directly supply care through a network of selectively contracted providers). In
spite of all this, price information for some roughly comparable packages can be collected,
in particular by referring to insurance policies that merely ensure a prede￿ned amount of
money when disability occurs (indemnity policy scheme). Table 5 reports actual prices of
individual LTC policies that cover di⁄erent monetary amounts for two insurance companies.
Table 5: A few yearly premiums from the Italian LTC insurance market (Nov. 2005)








Insurance Company A 194 388 583
Insurance Company B 241 474 693
Female
Insurance Company A 258 516 774
Insurance Company B 338 668 984
The scenarios considered in the bottom part of Table 4 can be compared to the values of
Table 5. What can be inferred is that the relationship between WTP and indemnity insured
resulting from our experiment is much steeper than the relationship emerging from market
products. It turns out that a match between demand and supply is in theory possible only
for high coverage levels.
In our analysis, we found that on average people are willing to pay more if programmes
are organised by public authorities. For individuals of average age, WTP for private insur-
ance is substantially below what subscribers are asked to pay in the market. Hence, expected
21bene￿ts of private coverage do not seem to be evaluated great enough by the average con-
sumer to compensate for insurance prices. This contributes to explaining the well-known
empirical evidence concerning the small size of LTC insurance markets.
On the other hand, preferences for public coverage are such that estimated WTP does
not di⁄er excessively from the amount that seems necessary for extending coverage to an
extent that regional health planners are actually considering. Yet, nearly 25% of the re-
spondents always prefer the status quo; and the probability of their being willing to extend
coverage increases with income. This may raise some relevant opposition to the programme
in particular in low income groups, who have probably more urgent priorities which could
justify an increase of the tax burden.
Interestingly, the di⁄erence between cost for coverage and WTP is not homogeneously
distributed across the population. For instance, in market policies males are required to pay
a lower premium than females, presumably because of a lower life expectancy. At the same
time, in our sample they are more willing to choose greater coverage. A similar result holds
for age, with younger individuals having cheaper access to private policies in the market
but displaying at the same time a larger propensity to cover in our hypothetical exercise.
This suggests that if insurance companies want to enlarge the market for LTC policies, they
should target young well-o⁄ males in particular, because the gap between expected cost
of coverage and WTP is by far lower than in other socio-economic groups. Such cream
skimming behaviour would leave unsolved the social problem of ensuring coverage to the
other socio-demographic groups.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has analysed the results of a discrete choice experiment carried out on a repre-
sentative sample of the population of the Italian region Emilia-Romagna. The experiment
was aimed at inferring the characteristics of potential demand for LTC risk insurance and
eliciting the WTP for some policy prospects. An analysis based on a stated preference ap-
proach is particularly useful for policy decisions when there is scarcity of information from
real data, and for comparing di⁄erent institutional scenarios.
A basic hypothetical scenario was varied according to the levels of four main attributes
which de￿ned the LTC coverage: the yearly cost of the insurance premium, the payment
scheme (voluntary subscription to a private insurer vs. compulsory personal income tax-
ation), the option right to extend coverage to residential care and the co-payment rate.
These attributes were all highly statistically signi￿cant, con￿rming that the characteristics
we considered are all in￿ uential and appropriate for the individuals.
From a methodological viewpoint, we developed the idea to provide the "opting out"
option with some economic structure, something often disregarded in the health economic
literature. Many variables considered in the nested logit speci￿cation proposed have highly
statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects, and indications concerning whether extending current LTC
22coverage or not are probably as economically relevant as WTP measures for LTC cover.
Moreover, modelling the demand for insurance in a choice experiment setting allows for
investigating pure demand e⁄ects, which are di¢ cult to identify because markets can be
crowded out by public intervention and, even when private markets exists, are often hindered
by the interference of supply side constraints, due to the incentives for private insurers to
select risks (e.g. Propper, 1993).
An important indication derived from the empirical analysis is that preferences for ex-
tending coverage for LTC risk are heterogeneous. Around one fourth of the sample opts
for the status quo, whereas the remaining fraction prefer greater levels of coverage than
what is currently ensured by the public sector. Moreover, a systematic in￿ uence of many
socio-demographic characteristics on the decision of whether or not to extend coverage has
been detected. When individual preferences are very heterogeneous, private rather than
public oriented solutions tend to be preferred, since the former better preserve consumer￿ s
sovereignty (e.g. Becker and Zweifel, 2004). However, against this general backdrop, two
aspects emerge in our analysis. First, the dimension over which preferences are shown to
di⁄er most is the extension of coverage, rather than the structure of the insurance package.
According to our modelling, what could mismatch preferences under public coverage is the
fact that compulsory payment is asked of some groups even if they would not be willing to
pay. However, since empirical analysis enables us to distinguish those groups which bene￿t
less from additional insurance, public authorities could minimise welfare losses by introduc-
ing exemption thresholds according to some observable characteristics such as income or
age. In this way, the non negligible political opposition to the reform would be probably
attenuated, and at the same time distortions in individual choice would be reduced. A
second important aspect relates to the fact that, in some areas of intervention, preferences
depend on the nature of the organisation providing a particular services. This is likely to
be the case for elderly care. In our sample, respondents on average are ready to pay an
extra-premium for having the same coverage publicly rather than privately provided. This
further attenuates the fears of possible welfare losses due to public provision. Overall, our
results provide a rationale for measures such as threshold exemptions, which are often also
observed in practice, and are here motivated on mere e¢ ciency rather than equity grounds,
as typically happens.
The welfare estimations derived from the regression results display a fairly high mean
WTP, with a value of 10-11 euros per percentage point of the copayment rate. This indication
leads to substantial WTP when the copayment is very low which, at least for some socio-
demographic groups, does not di⁄er excessively from insurance policies actually sold in the
market. As a note of caution, we must point out that the application of stated preference
techniques to insurance markets is a di¢ cult task, and that the use of the results must be
prudent. For example, we still ￿nd it unsatisfactory that a large part of overall WTP is not
captured by the attributes of our hypothetical coverage scheme, despite their high signi￿cance
23level, or by the individual-speci￿c variables included in the nested logit regressions, but by
the alternative speci￿c constant. Apparently, preferences over a very complex issue such as
the one analysed, are by far more articulated than it was possible to model with our analysis.
Further improvement both at the methodological and economic level are therefore necessary
in order to provide more in-depth insights on the subject of LTC insurance demand.
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